

STUDIES IN THE PĀLI GRAMMARIANS

I

Buddhaghosa's References to Grammar and Grammarians

Introduction

It is not known when and under what circumstances a distinct Buddhist grammatical literature devoted to the description of the language of the Pāli canon originated. It is reasonable to assume that, throughout the development of the Buddhist tradition, basic knowledge of the morphology and vocabulary of the canonical language was handed down in some form or another, even though it may never have been based upon any distinct grammatical tradition. The *Niddesa*, with its strings of glosses and morphological substitute forms may be considered an early instance of the level of sophistication of such basic knowledge.

Strange as it may seem, there is no indication at all in the extant *atthakathās* and *tikās* that the commentators knew of any Pāli grammar prior to the well-known grammar ascribed to Kaccāyana.¹ This would indicate that Kaccāyana's grammar may well have been the first recorded instance of a Pāli grammar. Although it is not known precisely when it was written, it is no doubt late. Perhaps it dates from the 7th—8th century A.D. since it is not referred to in any of the *atthakathās* except for *Ap-a*, a fairly late commentary.² It is there ascribed to Kaccāyana along with the *Mahānirutti* and *Nett*.³

R.O. Franke, who devoted a study — to the best of my knowledge the only one in existence — to the history and criticism of the

¹For the nature of this grammar cf. Franke, *Gramm.*, pp. 14-20 and Norman, *Pāli Literature* p. 163.

²Cf. Norman, op. cit. pp. 146-147.

³Cf. *Ap-a* 491,20.

indigenous Pāli grammar and lexicography, claimed that certain of the grammatical terms found in the commentaries ascribed to Buddhaghosa reflected an old Pāli grammatical system.⁴ This claim is questionable since the available evidence can hardly be said to justify the assumption of a full-fledged system of Pāli grammar before Kaccāyana. Apart from the fact that Buddhaghosa invariably uses a peculiar terminology for denoting the individual case relations, and that he uses the term *bhāvanapuṇṣaka*⁵ to denote the adverb, there is hardly a single grammatical term of any importance found in Buddhaghosa's works that does not have a parallel in Sanskrit grammatical terminology.

Franke⁶ assumed that the following verse which is often quoted by the Pāli grammarians originally belonged to a Pāli grammar antedating Buddhaghosa:

*paccattam upayogam ca karanam sampadāniyam
nisakkam sāmivacanam bhumman ālapanātthamam.*⁷

⁴Cf. Franke, op. cit. pp. 3-5.

⁵This term is not mentioned among the terms quoted by Franke, op. cit. pp. 3-4. Aggavāmsa has devoted a whole paragraph to it in the Saddanīti [cf. Sadd 717,15 foll.] because, as he says, it is the designation that is used in the scriptures (*sāsane vohāro*) in contrast to the term *kiriyāvīsesana* [= sa. *kriyāviśeṣana*] which is used in grammar (*saddasatthe*). The meaning of this peculiar term is probably "a term in the neuter that qualifies a verbal action". The term *bhāva* is borrowed from Sanskrit grammar.

⁶Op. cit. p. 4.

⁷Cf. e.g. Rūp 116,20; Sadd 60,32. In the context of the case terminology it is interesting to note that the term for the vocative, *ālapanam*, is used in the same sense in the Niddesa section of the Vinaya [cf. Vin III 73,33]. Unfortunately we are not in a position to trace the other terms back to the canon. It therefore remains uncertain when and under what circumstances they came to be an integral part of the exegetical and grammatical terminology of the Pāli.

On the contrary, according to Buddhapiya's Rūp-⁸ it is quoted from the Mahānirutti which, from the available evidence, appears to be an old commentary on Kacc.⁹ The verse was probably conceived by the author of the Mahānirutti as a summary of the terminology used in the *atthakathās*.

There is therefore no reason to believe that the few grammatical terms that have no parallel in Sanskrit grammatical terminology reflect an old system of Pāli grammar. They probably represent part of a terminology that originated with the attempt to establish a canonical exegesis. Buddhaghosa and subsequent generations of Theravāda scholars no doubt continued to use this peculiar terminology because it had become an inseparable part of the Theravāda heritage.

An instance of such canonical exegesis is found in the verse that Buddhaghosa invariably quotes in connection with his interpretation of the canonical stereotypes "*ekam samayam*" and "*tena samayena*":

*tam tam atham apekkhitvā bhummena karanena ca
aññatra samayo vutto upayogena so idhā ti.*¹⁰

With regard to this or that motive [the word] "*samaya*" is used elsewhere [in the Pāli] in the locative and the instrumental. In this context, however, it is used in the accusative.

⁸Cf. Rūp-[†] Be 1965 127,25.

⁹An analysis of the available fragments of Mahānirutti will be treated in *Studies in the Pāli Grammarians II*.

¹⁰Cf. Sv 33,27-28; Ps I 9,31-32; Spk I 11,32-33; Mp I 13,25-26. In order to make the verse fit the context, Buddhaghosa quotes it in a slightly edited version in his comment on "*ekena samayena*" in Sp 108,13-14.

Whenever Buddhaghosa quotes this verse, it is followed by a grammatical quotation which he ascribes to the *porānās*. In Buddhaghosa this normally means the *atthakathācariyas*:

*porānā pana vannayanti: “tasmin samaye ti vā, tena samayenā ti vā, tam samayan ti vā abhilāpamattabhedo esa. sabbattha bhummam eva attho” ti.*¹¹

The old ones, moreover, make the comment that “*tasmin samaye*”, or “*tena samayena*”, or “*tam samayam*” is merely a difference of expression. In all [three] cases the sense is nothing but locative.

This prose fragment is the only instance of a grammatical reference in Buddhaghosa where he expressly ascribes views on points of grammar to the *atthakathācariyas*. This would seem to support the conclusion that the peculiar case terminology was in use in the lost *atthakathās*. But this, of course, cannot be taken as an indication of the existence of a complete system of Pāli grammar. The verse and the prose fragment are clearly context-bound in the sense that they specifically deal with the interpretation of certain irregularities of canonical usage.

The fact that Buddhaghosa makes extensive use of this seemingly archaic terminology contrasts with the fact that his grammatical terminology in general consists of Pāli translations of Sanskrit technical terms. The *Samantapāśādikā*, which may be considered representative of Buddhaghosa's grammatical vocabulary,¹² contains

among others the following important technical terms: *accantasamyo γ ga* = sa. *atyantasamyo γ ga* [cf. Pāñ II 1 29], *ādesa* = sa. *ādeśa* [cf. Pāñ I 1 56], *itthambhūtakhyāna* = sa. *itthambhūtākhyāna* [cf. Pāñ I 4 90], *itthambhūtalakkhaṇa* = sa. *itthambhūtalakṣaṇa* [cf. Pāñ II 3 21], *upapada* [ts.; cf. Pāñ II 2 19 and passim], *upasagga* = sa. *upasarga* [cf. Pāñ I 4 59 and passim], *nipāta* [ts.; cf. Pāñ I 1 14 and passim], *nimitta* [= *nimittasaptamī*; ts.; cf. Mahā-bh ad Pāñ II 3 36],¹³ *bhāva* [ts.; cf. Pāñ I 2 21 and passim], *bhāvalakkhaṇa* = sa. *bhāvalakṣaṇa* [cf. Pāñ II 3 37], *līṅga* [ts.; cf. Pāñ II 4 26], *lopa* [ts.; cf. Pāñ I 1 60], *vipariṇāma* [ts.], *viparyāya* [= *vipallāsa*] = sa. *viparyā(-ā-)ya*, *vibhatti* = sa. *vibhakti*.

Examples such as these show clearly that Buddhaghosa's grammatical vocabulary was largely made up of terms derived from Sanskrit grammar with the addition of a few terms which we may deduce were in use in the *atthakathās*, the historical background and development of which remain unknown.

In several instances, however, Buddhaghosa explicitly refers his readers to grammar (*saddasattha* = sa. *śabdaśāstra*) or grammarians (*saddalakkhanavidū*,¹⁴ *saddavidū*, *akkharacintakā*) for information about points of grammar that will justify his own grammatical analyses of the

accantasamyo γ ga and *nimitta* (v. s.v. *nimittattha*) have erroneously been omitted from the index of grammatical terms. They are found, however, in the index of words and subjects.

¹³It is interesting that Vjb [Be 1960 57,26–27] on Sp 189,25 (*nimittatthe*) quotes a Pāli version of a Sanskrit verse which is quoted in Mahā-bh ad Pāñ II 3 36 as an illustration of *nimittasaptamī*.

¹⁴The actual meaning of this term is “those who know the rules of grammar”, i.e. grammarians. “*saddalakkhana*” stands for grammar in Buddhaghosa's works; cf. the usage of *śabda* and *lakṣaṇa* in Sanskrit grammar; v. Renou, *Vocabulaire s. vv.*

¹¹Cf. Sv 33,29–31; Ps I 10,1–3; Spk I 12,1–3; Mp I 13,27–29; Sp 108,15–17.

¹²Cf. Sp VIII [indexes]. For unknown reasons the terms *bhāva* and *bhāvalakkhaṇa* [e.g. at Sp 108,1] are not recorded in the indexes. The terms

Pāli. This gives rise to the rather interesting problem of trying to identify the grammatical source or sources to which Buddhaghosa refers.

In the following analysis a number of such references found in Buddhaghosa's works will be addressed. Since there is uncertainty about the actual authorship of some of the works ascribed to Buddhaghosa, the analysis has been limited to those works for which the authorship is beyond doubt: Visuddhimagga [Vism], Samantapāsādikā [Sp], and the commentaries on the āgamās: Sumanāgavilāsinī [Sv], Papañcasūdanī [Ps], Sāratthappakāsinī [Spk], and Manorathapūraṇī [Mp].¹⁵ Sp is especially rich in grammatical references, but the other commentaries also contain interesting material. In a few instances grammatical statements where Buddhaghosa does not explicitly refer to grammar have been analysed. Such instances are included here either because of their general interest or because they belong to the same set of problems which Buddhaghosa analyses in similar contexts with reference to grammar or grammarians.

The sources to which Buddhaghosa refers have in almost every instance been identified as Pāṇinian grammar, and although the present study does not claim to be exhaustive, it should certainly present sufficient evidence of the pervasive influence of Sanskrit grammar on Buddhaghosa's grammatical analyses. It would thus seem that a reconsideration of the role of Sanskrit in the formation and history of the Pāli grammatical literature is necessary. This will be addressed further in the conclusion.

Visuddhimagga

1 [Vism 8,2-6]

¹⁵For an analysis of the works ascribed to Buddhaghosa, v. Norman, *Pāli Literature* pp. 120-130.

In the first example from Visuddhimagga, Buddhaghosa comments upon the meaning of the word “*sīla*” as it is defined by the grammarians (*saddalakkhanavidū*), in contrast to those “etymologists” who derive the word from “*siras*” (head) and “*sitala*” (cool).¹⁶

*ken' atthena sīlan ti. sīlanatthena sīlam. kim idam
sīlanam nāma. samādhānam vā: kāyakammādinam
susīlyavasena avippakīṇatā ti attho; upadhāranam vā:
kusalānam dhammānam patītīhānavasena [so read with
v.l.] ādhārabhāvo ti attho. etad eva h' ettha [v.l. hi
ettha] atthadvayaṁ saddalakkhanavidū anujānanti.*¹⁷

In what sense is it virtue? It is virtue in the sense of discipline. What does discipline mean? It means either composure (*samādhānam*), that is, the quality of not being scattered because the acts of the body, etc., are well disciplined, or supporting (*upadhāranam*), that is, being a support due to its being the basis of good dhammas. These two are the only meanings which the grammarians admit in this case.

The grammarians to which Buddhaghosa refers here cannot without further evidence be identified with any particular grammatical school. But we are probably justified in assuming that they belong to Pāṇini's school since the two meanings which Buddhaghosa ascribes to *sil* are identical with those recorded in the collection of roots which is

¹⁶Cf.: *aññe pana “sirattho sīlatho sītalattho sīlattho” ti evamādinā nayen’ ev’ ettha attham vāṇṇayanti*, Vism 8,8-10. This is probably a reference to Vimuttimagga. For a translation of the passage in question see *The Path of Freedom* p. 8.

¹⁷Qu. Patis-a 15,30-35.

traditionally ascribed to the Pāninians. Cf. sa-Dhātup I 556: *śīla samādhau* and sa-Dhātup X 332: *śīla upādharane*.¹⁸

2 [Vism 210,21–28]

This interesting passage is part of the paragraph where Buddhaghosa brings the canonical “etymologies” of the word “bhagavan” into focus. After closing the first section of the paragraph with a reference to the Niddesa for detailed information on the method of analysing (*naya*) its various derivations and meanings,¹⁹ he continues by quoting a verse that exemplifies an alternative method of analysing (*aparo nayo*) the word “bhagavan”:

*bhāgyavā bhaggavā yutto bhagehi ca vibhattavā
bhattavā vantagamano bhavesu bhagavā tato ti.*

Before he continues discussing each of these “etymologies”, Buddhaghosa presents a concise description of the rules of derivation upon which they are based.²⁰ He writes:

*tattha, vannāgamo vannavipariyayo ti ādikam nirutti-
lakkhaṇam gahetvā, saddanayena vā pisodarādipak-
khepalakkhaṇam gahetvā, yasmā lokiyalokuttara-
sukhābhinibbattakam dānasilādipārappattam bhāgyam*

¹⁸ Cf. Sadd 434,30 foll; 435,7 foll.; 564,25.

¹⁹ Cf. Vism 210,19 and Nidd I 142,25 foll.

²⁰ Buddhaghosa and other commentators often refer to or quote Vism on this verse for detailed information on its analysis; cf. Sp 123,13 foll.; Sv 34,10; Ps I 10,15; Spk I 12,16; Mp I 14,13; Ud-a 24,21; It-a I 6,15; Pj I 107,27 foll.; II 444,8; Paṭis-a I 532,12; only Nidd-a I 264,7 foll. elaborates on Buddhaghosa’s analysis; cf. note 23 infra.

*assa atthi, tasmā bhāgyavā ti vattabbe bhagavā ti
vuccatī ti nātabbam.*

In this case it should be known — either by adopting the rule of etymology (*niruttilakkhaṇam*) which runs: “letter insertion, letter metathesis”, etc., or by adopting, according to the method of grammar (*saddanayena*), the rule that consists in interpolating [the word in question] in [the word class] beginning with “pisodara”²¹ — that since he is blessed with having been perfected with regard to charity and morality, etc., which gives rise to mundane and transmundane happiness, he is called “bhagavan”, although [in actuality] he ought to be called “bhāgyavan”.

In this passage Buddhaghosa quotes the beginning of a Pāli version of the first pada of a Sanskrit verse summarizing five principles of etymological analysis, in order to identify the scope of the rule of etymology (*niruttilakkhaṇam*). The Sanskrit version is found in Kāśikā ad Pāṇ VI 3 109²²:

²¹ Cf. Dhammapāla’s commentary: *ādikan ti ādisaddena vannavikāro, vannalopo, dhātuathena niyojanāt cā ti imam tividham lakkhaṇam saṅgahāti. saddanayenā ti byākarananayena. pisodarādīnam saddānam ākatiganabhāvato vuttam piso ... pe ... gahetvā ti pakkhipanam eva lakkhaṇam. tappariyāpannaiākarānam hi pakkhipanam* [Vism-mhṭ Be 1960 I 253,16-20]. Cf. also Vism-mhṭ Be 1960 II 252,3-4: *vannāgamo vannavipariyayavikāravināsadhātuathavisesayogehi pañcavidhassa niruttilakkhaṇassa vasena*, and see next.

²² The original Sanskrit version was identified by H.C. Warren; cf. Vism (ed. HOS) p. 173,30.

varṇāgamo varṇaviparyayaś ca dvau cāparau varṇavikāranāśau dhātōs tadarthātiśayena yogas tad ucyate pañcavidham niruktam.

Letter insertion, letter metathesis, and the following two, namely, letter modification and letter elision, [plus] connecting the root with a meaning surpassing its [own] meaning — these are called the five ways of etymological analysis.²³

²³The first complete Pāli version of this verse is, to the best of my knowledge, found in Upasena's commentary on the Niddesa, which often refers to, or quotes, Buddhaghosa's Vism. The passage where the verse occurs is nothing but an elaborate version of the present section of Vism. It is important because it illustrates how the various principles of etymological analysis were applied to Pāli words. Cp. Nidd-a I 264,7–265,3:

*varṇāgamo, varṇaviparyāyo,
dve cāpare varṇavikāranāśa,
dhātūnam atthāisayena yogo,
tad uccate pañcavidham niruttan ti*

*evam vuttaniruttilakkhanam gahetvā padasiddhi veditabbā. tattha:
"nakkhattarājā-r-iva tārakānān" [=Ja V 148,9; Pj II 146,6] ti ettha rakārāgamo
viya avijjamānassa akkharassa āgamo varṇāgamo nāma. himsanā himso ti
vattabbe sīho ti viya vijjamānakkharānām heṭṭhupariyavasena parivattanam
varṇaviparyāyo nāma. "navacchādake dāne dīyatī" [=Ja III 288,13 (cf. v.ll.)] ti
ettha akārasa ekārāpajarañāti viya akkharassa atthakkharāpajarañāti varṇavikāro
nāma. jīvanassa mūto jīvanamūto ti vattabbe jīmūto ti vakāranakārānām vināśo
viya vijjamānakkharavīnāśo varṇavīnāśo nāma. "phārusāhi vācāhi pakubbamāno
āsajja man tvañ vadasi kumārā" [=Ja IV 47,12] ti ettha pakubbamāno-padassa
abhibhavamāno ti atthapañipādanam viya tattha tattha yathāyogam
visesatthayogo dhātūnam atthāisayena yogo nāma. evam niruttilakkhanam
gahetvā, saddanayena vā pisodarādipakkhepalakkhanam gahetvā yasmā
lokiyalokuttarasukhābhinibbattakam dānasilādipārappattam bhāgyam assa atthi,
tasmā bhāgyavāti vattabbe bhagavāti vuccatīti nātabbam. The verse is quoted
in Ap-a 102,17-18 (incomplete version), a comparatively late commentary, and is*

The grammatical method (*saddanaya*) consists in analysing the word "bhagavan" as if it were a member of the class of word forms (*ākṛtigāna*)²⁴ belonging to the *gaṇapātha* "pr̄śodarādī", to which Pāṇini refers in Pāṇ VI 3 109: "pr̄śodarādīni" yathopadīṣṭam: [the elision, insertion and modification of letters that are observed in such cases as] "pr̄śodara", etc., follows the way in which they are stated [by the experts in etymology].

There is clearly no absolute contrast between the two methods since the words that are members of the *gaṇapātha* are subject to much the same rules of derivation as those defined in the verse quoted by the Kāśikā and Buddhaghosa.²⁵ The reason why they are contrasted in this case is probably the fact that "etymology" as such is not within the scope of Pāṇinian grammar, but belongs to a separate branch of grammatical *śāstra*.

It is not possible to identify the source from which Buddhaghosa quotes, nor are we in a position to decide whether he himself is responsible for translating the Sanskrit original into Pāli, or whether he was simply adopting an already existing Pāli version. It is highly unlikely that he should have quoted the verse from the Kāśikā since this important commentary is generally supposed to have been written in the 7th century A.D. All we can safely say is that

often quoted by the Pāli grammarians; cf. e.g. Rūp 277,13-16; Mogg-p 29,5-8 [cf. Mogg-p 29,9 foll. and Mogg-pd pp. 38-39 ad loc.]; Sadd 877,9-11.

²⁴The *ākṛtigāna* is by definition an open list of words to which other words undergoing the same operations may be added. Cf. Renou, *Vocabulaire* and *DSG* s.v.

²⁵Cf. Kāś ad Pāṇ VI 3 109: *pr̄śodaraprakārāni* śabdarūpāṇi, yeṣu lopāgama-varṇavikārāḥ sāstrenā na vihitāḥ dr̄śyante ca, tāni yathopadīṣṭāni sādhūni bhavanti. yāni yāni yathopadīṣṭāni, sīṣṭair uccāritāni prayuktāni, tāni tathāvāṇigantavyāni; cf. also Mahā-bh ad loc.

Buddhaghosa and the authors of the Kāśikā were conversant with a grammatical tradition where the verse was somehow attached to this specific Pāṇini sūtra as part of its commentary. Patañjali does not quote the verse ad loc., but this, of course, does not exclude the possibility that it belongs to a grammatical tradition antedating Patañjali.

In any case, it clearly appears from Buddhaghosa's concise description of the two methods that he was assuming that his readers would easily be able to identify the full scope of the analytical principles involved, on the basis of a summary reference.

3 [Vism 310,18–22]

In this example Buddhaghosa discusses briefly the etymology of the word *satta* (= sa. *sattva*) as it occurs in the passage (= Paṭis II 130,26 foll.: *sabbe sattā averā abyāpajjhā ... attānam parihantu*, etc.) upon which he is commenting. First he quotes S III 190,2–6²⁶ where the word is defined in terms of a human being who is attached to (*satta* = sa. *sakta*) and clings to (*visatta* = sa. *viśakta*) the khandhas. He continues:

*rūlhīsaddena pana vitarāgesu pi ayam vohāro vattati
yeva, vilivamaye pi vījanīvisese tālavanṭavohāro viya.
akkharacintakā pana attham avicāretvā nāmamattam
etan ti icchanti. ye pi attham vicārenti te sattayogena
[so read for Ee satvāyogena] sattā ti icchanti.²⁷*

However, because it is a conventional term (*rūlhīsadda*), this designation also applies to those who are

²⁶*rūpe kho Rādha yo chando yo rāgo yā nandi yā tanhā tatra satto tatra visatto tasmā satto ti vuccati. vedanāya saññāya sañkhāresu viññāne yo chando yo rāgo yā nandi yā tanhā tatra satto tatra visatto tasmā satto ti vuccati ti.*

²⁷Qu. Paṭis-a 604,36–38 and 57,20–22.

without desire, just as the word “palm fan” [*tālavanta* = sa. *tālavṛnta*] applies to a particular kind of fan, although it is made of split bamboo. But the grammarians (*akkharacintakā*) maintain that it is a mere name (*nāmamattam*) without considering its meaning. Some people who take its meaning into consideration maintain that beings are called “*sattā*” [= sa. *sattva*, mfn.] because they are possessed of “*satta*” [= sa. *sattva*, n.], intelligence.

It is uncertain which grammarians Buddhaghosa refers to in this context. The reference is too concise to enable us to trace it to any specific grammatical work. What is important in this context is that he contrasts the idea that the term as such can be derived [although it can be applied in other meanings than the one which is supported by the etymology] with the grammarians' claim that it is a mere name for which no etymology can be adduced. There is no reason to doubt that the origin of this discussion is to be found in the Sanskrit grammatical tradition. Unfortunately Dhammapāla's commentary does not offer any clue to what Buddhaghosa's sources might have been.

4 [Vism 423,23–25]

In this paragraph Buddhaghosa explains why the “eye of knowledge” (*ñānacakkhu*) has the epithet “divine” (*dibbam*). He presents inter alia the following two explanations followed by the remark that they should be known according to grammar:

ālokapariggahena mahājutikattā pi dibbam, tiro-
kuḍḍādigataśupadassanena mahāgatikattā pi dibbam.
tam sabbam saddasatthānusārena veditabbam.²⁸

It is both “divine” because it is of great splendour (*mahājutikattā*) due to its possessing light, and “divine” because it has an enormous range (*mahāgatikattā*) due to its seeing objects that are far removed in space and the like. All this should be known according to grammar.

As in the first example from Vism, Buddhaghosa’s commentary deals with a question of semantics: the meaning of the root \sqrt{div} . Since he uses the terms *mahājutikatta* and *mahāgatikatta* in order to define the meaning of the epithet “*dibba*”, one would assume that this grammatical reference too is to sa-Dhātup where the two meanings *juti* (to light) and *gati* (to move), among others, are ascribed to \sqrt{div} . Cf. sa-Dhātup IV 1 *divū: krīḍāvijigīśāvyavahāradyutistutimodanamadasvapnakāntigatisu*. Dhammapāla’s *ṭīkā* supports the assumption²⁹.

5 [Vism 518,27–32]

²⁸An identical passage is found in Sp 163,7-9 ad Vin III 5,1: *so dibbena*.
²⁹*evam vihāravijayiccchāvohārajutigatisaṅkhātānam atthānam vasena imassa abhiññānassa dibbacakkhubhāvasiddhito. saddavidū ca tesu eva atthesu divū- saddam icchantī ti vuttam “tam sabbam saddasatthānusārena veditabban” ti [Vism-mhṭ Be II 56,27-57,2 ad loc.]; cf. also mahājutikattā mahāgatikattā ti etesu “saddasatthānusārenā” ti vuttam [Vjb Be 1960 51,27-28 ad Sp 163,7-9]; ke ci pana jutigatiatthesu pi saddavidū divū-saddam icchantī ti mahājutikattā mahāgatikattā ti idam eva dvayam sandhāya vuttam. tasmā “saddasatthānusārena veditabban” ti idam dibbati jotayatī ti dibbam [Sp-ṭ Be 1903,10-12 ad Sp 163,7-9]; Sadd 475,24 foll.*

In this passage Buddhaghosa analyses the meaning of the suffix *-tā*, when used in the compound “*idappaccayatā*”. He writes:

*yathā vuttānam [i.e. in S II 25,17] etesam jarāmarañādīnam paccayato vā paccayasamūhato vā idappaccayatā ti vutto. tatrāyam vacanatho: imesam paccayā idappaccayā; idappaccayā eva idappaccayatā; idappaccayānam vā samūho idappaccayatā. lakkhaṇam pan’ ettha saddasatthato pariyesitabbam.*³⁰

The term “*idappaccayatā*” is used either in terms of the conditions of these, or in terms of the collection of conditions of these, such as they have been explained [above], namely, old age, death and the rest. The meaning of the expression in this case is as follows: “*idappaccayā*” means “conditions of these”; “*idappaccayatā*” means “exclusively (eva) conditions of these”. Or, “*idappaccayatā*” means “a collection of conditions of these”. In these cases, moreover, the rule should be sought in grammar.

The grammatical rules to which Buddhaghosa in this case asks his reader to refer are two Pāṇini sūtras. The one which justifies the first alternative is Pāṇ V 4 27: *devāt tal*: the suffix “*tā*”, when attached to the word “*deva*” [means “*deva*” as such].³¹ In order to make the delimitative force of the suffix clear Buddhaghosa uses the particle “*eva*” to which Indian grammar traditionally ascribes a delimitative and restrictive force (*avadhārana*).³² The second is Pāṇ IV 2 [37+] 43: *grāmajanabandhu-*

³⁰This text is identical with Spk II 41,7 foll., q.v.

³¹Cf. *devaśabdāt svārthe talpratyayo bhavati. deva eva devatā* [Kāś ad loc].

³²On this term cf. Renou, *Terminologie* s.v.

sahāyebhyas tal: the suffix “*tā*”, when attached to the words “*grāma*”, “*jana*”, “*bandhu*”, and “*sahāya*” [denotes “a collection thereof” (*tasya samūhah* = 37)].³³ Dhammapāla’s tīkā corroborates in both cases the assumption of Pāṇinian grammar as Buddhaghosa’s source with implicit references to Kāśikā ad loc.³⁴

For purely doctrinal reasons Buddhaghosa does not refer his reader to the well-known Pāṇini sūtra V 1 119 defining the other more general function of the abstract suffixes “*tva*” and “*tā*”: *tasya bhāve tvatalau*: the abstract suffixes “*tva*” and “*tā*” are used in the sense of the essence or quality of the thing [denoted by the term to which the two suffixes are attached]. But it is clear that there must have been some Buddhist scholars who did actually interpret *idappaccayatā* with reference to this function of the suffix “*tā*”, because Buddhaghosa refers briefly to their view, but only to refute it.³⁵

6 [Vism 519,34–520,6]

In this section Buddhaghosa presents and rejects the interpretation of some Buddhists who maintain that the term “*paṭiccasamuppāda*” denotes mere arising (*uppādamattam*), in the sense

³³Cf.: *grāmādibhyah talpratyayo bhavati, tasya samūhah ity etasmin visaye. grāmānām samūhah grāmatā, janatā, bandhitā, sahāyatā* [Kāś ad loc].

³⁴Cf.: *idappaccayā eva idappaccayatā ti tā-saddena padam vaddhitam; na kiñci athantaram; yathā devo eva devatā ti. idappaccayānam vā samūho idappaccayatā ti. samūhattham tā-saddam āha, yathā janānam samūho janatā ti* [Vism-mhṭ Be 1960 II 228,19-22 = Spk-pt Be 1960 II 50,22-26; Be om. *na kiñci athantaram* and reads *samūhattho tā-saddo*; and adds *imam atham sandhāyāha: lakkhanam ... pe ... veditabban ti*]. Vism-sn 1250,15-16 refers correctly to Pāṇ IV 2 37 and 43, but does not identify the other source, i.e. Pāṇ V 4 27.

³⁵Cf.: *ye pi manthanti: idappaccayām bhāvo idappaccayatā, bhāvo ca nāma yo ākāro āvijjādīnam saṅkhārādipātubhāve hetu, so tasmīm saṅkhāravikāre paṭiccasamuppādasamāññā ti, tesam tam na yujjati*, Vism 520,15-18.

that it means arising dependently (*paṭicca*) and correctly so (*sammā*), that is, without reference to such causes as those which the heretics imagine, namely, Primordial Matter (*pakati*), The Person (*purisa*) and the like.³⁶

The final argument of the four which Buddhaghosa presents for rejecting this idea is that it is not justified because according to their interpretation the term “*paṭicca*” becomes semantically disjointed from the rest of the compound and is therefore virtually meaningless (*saddabhedato*).³⁷ The argument is developed in the following paragraph. Buddhaghosa does not explicitly refer to grammar in this instance, but the nature and importance of the argument are such that it would seem natural to include it among his grammatical references. He writes:

saddabhedato ti paṭiccasaddo ca pan’ āyam samāne kattari pubbakāle payujjamāno athasiddhikaro hoti. seyyathidam: “cakkhuñ ca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuviññānan” [= S II 72,4] ti. idha pana bhāva-sādhanena uppādasaddena saddhim payujjamāno

³⁶Cf.: *keci pana paṭicca sammā ca titthiyaparikappitapakatipurisādi-kāraṇanirapekkho uppādo paṭiccasamuppādo ti evam uppādamattam paṭiccasamuppādo ti vadanti*, Vism 518,33-35. It is not clear to whom Buddhaghosa refers. The emphasis is on arising as such without particular reference to its causes and conditions provided that heretical ideas of causes, such as the *prakṛti* of Sāṃkhya, etc., are excluded. Could it be that Buddhaghosa briefly presents the view of SthaviraVasuvarmā, which is referred to in Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa as follows: *aheruniryahetuvādapratisedhārtham ity apare* [= Sthaviravasuvarmā, Sphuṭārtha ad loc.]. *nāsatī hetau bhāvo bhavati, na cānutpattimato nityāt prakṛtipuruṣādikāt kiñcid utpadyata iti*, AkBhās 47,7-8 ? Perhaps Vasuvarmā interpreted “*pratityasamutpāda*” in the light of the other canonical explanation of arising “*asmin satādām bhavati, asyotpādād idam utpadyate*”, to which the quotation relates. In any case it has this generalised form which appears to be the idea underlying the view which Buddhaghosa rejects.

³⁷Cf. Dhammapāla’s tīkā: *saddabhedato ti saddavināsato saddāyogato* [Vism-mhṭ Be 1960 II 230,20-21].

samānassa kattu abhāvato saddabhedam gacchati, na ca kiñci attham sādheti ti saddabhedato pi na uppādamattam pāticcasamuppādo ti.

“Because of word disjunction”: again, when the word “*paticca*”, provided that the agent is the same (*samāne kattari*), is used in the sense of [the action expressed by the verb to which the absolute suffix is added] being anterior in time [to the action expressed by the finite verb], it achieves its meaning (*athasiddhikaro*). As, for instance, [in the following sentence]: “After having come into contact with the eye and the sense objects, eye consciousness arises [= S II 72,4]”. In the present case, however, when [the word “*paticca*”] is used together with the word “*uppāda*” which is an action noun (*bhāvasādhanena*),³⁸ it leads to word disjunction since the agent is not the same, and so it does not achieve any meaning at all. Therefore, also because of word disjunction, *pāticcasamuppāda* is not mere arising.

What is important for Buddhaghosa to point out in this connection is that, in order for the term “*pāticcasamuppāda*” to be meaningful, it is necessary for the two actions expressed by the absolute form “*paticca*” and the action noun “*samuppāda*” to have the same agent (*kattā*). If this were not the case, there would be no connection between them in terms of their having the same agent. To illustrate this point Buddhaghosa quotes a well-known passage from *Samyuttanikāya* where *cakkhuvīññāna*, by implication, represents the

identical agent of the successive verbal actions expressed by “*paticca*” and “*uppajati*”.³⁹ The opponent, however, generalizes the scope of meaning of “*pāticcasamuppāda*” to such an extent that it becomes virtually impossible to interpret it with reference to specific agents and specific causes and conditions. Consequently, the action expressed by the term “*paticca*” would not at all relate, by virtue of identity of agent, to the action expressed by “*uppāda*”.

In order to clarify this idea he makes an implicit reference to Pāṇini’s definition of the usage and meaning of the absolute suffix (*ktvā*), which is found in Pāṇ III 4 21: *samānakartṛkayoh pūrvakāle*: [when two verbal actions] have the same agent [the absolute suffix attached to the verb expressing one action] is used in the sense of being anterior in time [to the action expressed by the other verb].⁴⁰

Buddhaghosa’s interpretation, of course, entails the obvious paradox that in order for *cakkhuvīññāna* to arise it must first be dependent and thus already existent, which makes its arising illogical. Perhaps the underlying intention of the opponent’s thesis was exactly to avoid this paradox by emphasising the notion of origination, in which case Buddhaghosa stands out as a conservative defender of what he considered to be the correct Theravāda tradition, while at the same time adhering strictly to the original Pāṇinian definition of the semantical function of the absolute suffix.

We know from a parallel discussion with grammarians recorded in Vasubandhu’s *Abhidharmakośa* about the correct interpretation of “*pāticcasamuppāda*”,⁴¹ that the Buddhists tried to avoid the unwanted

³⁹On the paradox which this interpretation entails see the following.

⁴⁰Cf.: *samānah kartā yayoh dhātvarthayos tatra pūrvakāle dhātvarthe vartamānād dhātoḥ ktvā pratyayo bhavati* [Kāś ad loc.].

⁴¹Cf. the grammarians’ objection: *na yukta esa padārthah. kim kāraṇam? ekasya hi kartur dvayoh kriyayoh pūrvakālāyām kriyāyām ktvāvidhir bhavati. tad*

³⁸On this technical term of grammar cf. Renou *Vocabulaire* and DSG s.v.

implications, pointed out by the grammarians, of a strict Pāṇinian interpretation of “*paṭicca*”, by taking the absolute suffix as indicating an action that takes place simultaneously with the action expressed by the action noun “*samuppāda*”. For this interpretation they could refer to one of Katyāyana’s vārtikas on Pāṇini’s sūtra, which allows for interpreting “*paṭicca*” as expressing an action that is simultaneous with the action expressed by “*samuppāda*”.⁴²

We do not find any trace of this discussion in Buddhaghosa’s works, but it was well-known to subsequent generations of Pāli writers.⁴³ Dhammapāla, who was conversant with this discussion and the relevant Sanskrit grammatical literature, as appears from his *ṭīkā*, is evidently embarrassed by the implications of Buddhaghosa’s criticism and tries to avoid them by claiming that Buddhaghosa only refers to Pāṇini’s definition of the usage of the absolute suffix in general terms (*yebhuyyena*), whereas in the present case the term “*paṭicca*” can only be interpreted as expressing an action that is simultaneous with the action expressed by “*samuppāda*”.⁴⁴

yathā: *snātvā bhūnktita iti. na cāsau pūrvam utpādāt kaścid asti, yaḥ prātyottarakālam upadyate. na cāpy akarīkāsti kriye iti*, AkBhāś 454,1-4.

⁴²Cf.: *vyādāya svapitīty upasamkhyānam apūrvakālatvāt, vāt. 5 ad loc.* Vasubandhu refers to this vārttika in his reply to the grammarians: *sahabhāvē pi ca ktvāsti dipaṇ prāpya tamo gatam; āsyāpi vyādāya śete vā, paścāc cet kiṁ na samyṛte*, AkBhāś 455,7-8. Cf. Vism-sn p. 1254,12: *dipaṇ prāpya tamo vigacchat*.

⁴³Cf. the following passage from Mahānāma’s [first half of the sixth century A.D.] commentary on Patis: *nimittam paṭisaṅkhā ḥāṇam uppajjati* [Patis II 63,34-35], *kāmañ ca na paṭhamam jānitvā pacchā ḥāṇam uppajjati; vohāravasena pana “mānañ ca paṭicca dhamme ca uppajjati manoviññānāñ*” ti ādīni viya evam vuccati. *Saddasathavidiū pi ca “ādiccam pāpūnityā tamo vigacchat”* ti ādīsu viya samānakāle’ pi imam pādañ icchanti [= Patis-a 567,12-16 ad loc.]; for the reference to grammarians cf. the parallel passage from AkBhāś quoted supra.

⁴⁴Cf.: *samāne kattari ti ekasmim yeva kattari uppajjanakiriyāya yo kattā, tasmim yeva paccayanakiriyāya ca kattubhūte ti attho. yathā “nhatvā bhūñjati; bhutvā*

It would be interesting to know whether Buddhaghosa relied on Sanskrit sources for the elaborate discussion of “*paṭiccasamuppāda*” in Chapter 17 of Visuddhimagga, which from a doctrinal point of view is one of the most complex sections of the work. It is not unlikely, but only a detailed investigation of the chapter as a whole will make it possible to reach a conclusion on this point.

The present context is sufficient to conclude that the references to grammar and grammarians in Visuddhimagga clearly indicate that

*sayati” ti. pubbakāle ti idañ ca tvā-saddānam padānam yebhuyyena purimakālakiriyāya dīpanato vuttam. na idha paṭiccasaddassa purimakālatthātā. evañ hi “cakkhuñ paṭicca” ti nidassanavacanam nidassitabbena sāmsandeyya. atha vā, kāmañ c’ ettha ubhinnam kiriyanam samakālatā uppajjanakiriyāya pubbe paccayanakiriyāya asambhavato. tathā pi phalakiriyāya hetukiriyā purimakālo viya voharitum yuttā evam ettha hetuphalavavatthānam supākātam hoti ti upacārasiddham purimakālam gahetvā vuttam pubbakāle ti. atthasiddhikaro ti vākyatthapatiññattikaro. paṭiccasamuppādo ti hi ettha vākyatthāvabodho idha atthasiddhī ti adhippeto. payujjāmāno paṭiccasaddo uppādāsaddena vuccamānassa samānassa kattu abhāvato ti pādañ ānetvā yojetabbam. ayañ h’ ettha attho “cakkhuñ ca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuññāñ” ti ādīsu paccayanakiriyāya, uppajjanakiriyāya ca viññānam eva kattā ti samānakattujatā labbhati. paṭiccasamuppādo ti ettha pana uppādāsaddassa bhāvasādhanatāya kiriyanāva vuttā ti samānakattulakkhañ saddappayogo na sambhavati ti. tenāha “saddabhedam gacchati” ti. apasaddappayogo hoti ti attho. na c’ ettha parāparayogo [= Pāñ III 4 20] “appatvā nadim pabbato, atikamma pabbatam nadī” ti ādīsu viya; nāpi lakkhañhetuññādipayogo “sīham disvā bhayam hoti, ghātāñ pivitvā balam jāyate, ‘dhan’ ti katvā dāñdo patito” ti ādīsu viya. n’ ev’ ettha saddabhedo. na hi hatthatale āmalakām viya sabbaññeyyam paccakkhañ katvā ṣṭhitānam māhesinām vacane akkharacintānam vippalāpo avasaram labhati. labhatu, vākyatthena saddasiddhito “nhatvā gamanam, bhutvā sayanan” ti ādīsu viyā ti. evam pi na ca kiñci attham sādheti. yadi pi paccekam padattho labbhati, vākyatthe pana na yujjati, tasmā dasadādimādivākyāni viya asambandhatthātāya nirathakam hoti ti adhippāyo [Vism-mhṭ Be 1960 II 231,18-232,17 ad loc.]; cf. also ibid. p. 238,1-4: samānakāle tāvā: *andhakāram nihantvāra, udito ‘yam dipākaro ... keci pana “mukhañ byādāya sayati”*, which is an echo of the discussion in AkBhāś, for which v. note 42 supra.*

Buddhaghosa was conversant with the Sanskrit grammatical tradition, which in all likelihood is identical with Pāṇinian grammar. This conclusion is furthermore corroborated by the evidence found in the *atthakathās* ascribed to Buddhaghosa. In the following a number of references to grammar and grammarians found in these works will be analysed.

Samantapāsādikā

1 [Sp 204,25–32 ad Vin III 13,5–6]

In the Vinaya passage which Buddhaghosa comments upon: *na tvam tāta Sudinna kiñci dukkhassa jānāsi ti*, it would seem natural to construe *na ... kiñci jānāsi* with *dukkhassa*, in the sense: “you, good Sudinna, know nothing of misery”.⁴⁵ This is apparently what he had in mind, as is evident from the following paraphrase: *tvam tāta Sudinna kiñci appamattakam pi kalabhāgam dukkhassa na jānāsi*: “you, good Sudinna, know nothing, i.e., not even the slightest fraction of a fraction, of misery”. But in addition to this straightforward exegesis, he offers two more complex alternative interpretations of the clause:

athavā kiñci dukkhena nānubhosī ti attho: karaṇatthe sāmivacanam anubhavanatthe ca jānanā. athavā kiñci dukkham na sarasī ti attho: upayogatthe svāmivacanam saraṇatthe ca jānanā. vikappadvaye pi purimapadassa uttarapadena samānavibhātilopo

⁴⁵This interpretation presupposes that *kiñci* is used substantively and is to be construed with *dukkhassa*. It is, of course, also possible to construe *kiñci* adverbially, in which case *dukkhassa* has to be construed with *jānāsi* in the sense suggested by Buddhaghosa in the following.

datthabbo. tam sabbam saddasatthānusārena nātabbam.

Either the meaning is: “you do not suffer from any misfortune”, the genitive (*sāmivacanam*) being used in the sense of the instrumental (*karaṇatthe*) and *√jñā* in the sense of “experiencing, suffering” (*anubhavanatthe*), or the meaning is: “you do not remember any misfortune”, the genitive being used in the sense of the accusative (*upayogatthe*) and *√jñā* in the sense of “remembering, recalling” (*saraṇatthe*). In either alternative (*vikappadvaye*), however, one should take into consideration that the case morpheme which the preceding word (*purimapadassa = kiñci*) has in common with the subsequent word (*uttarapadena = dukkhassa*) is elided (*samānavibhātilopo*). All this should be known in accordance with grammar (*saddasatthānusārena*).

According to this interpretation, it is obvious that *kiñci* becomes difficult to construe unless it is assumed that it is in agreement with *dukkhassa*. Buddhaghosa therefore postulates that *kiñci* is actually in agreement with *dukkhassa*, when it is assumed that *kiñci = kassaci* because the genitive case morpheme which indicates the agreement has been elided from *kiñci*.

It has not been possible to find any justification in traditional Indian grammar for adding supposedly elided case morphemes in the way suggested by Buddhaghosa, but the grammar which justifies his interpretation of *√jñā* constructed with the genitive in the sense indicated above can easily be identified. In both cases it is based on the application of two Pāṇini sūtras. The first alternative is undoubtedly based on Pāṇ II

3 [50+] 51: *jñō 'vidarthasya karane*: the verb $\sqrt{vijñā}$, when not used in the sense of “to know”, is constructed with the genitive in the sense of the instrument *kāraka*.⁴⁶ The second is based on the subsequent sūtra Pāñ II 3 [50+] 52: *adhīgarthadayeśām karmani*: verbs, when used in the sense of “remembering” [cf. sa-Dhātup II 38] ... , are constructed with the genitive in the sense of the object *kāraka*.⁴⁷

There is no reason to doubt that the grammar (*saddasattha*) Buddhaghosa refers to is identical with Pāñinian grammar. But the grammatical source which justifies *samānavibhāttilopo* remains unknown. If there were any identifiable grammatical tradition justifying *samānavibhāttilopo* in the way suggested by Buddhaghosa, it is unlikely that an eminent scholar like Sāriputta would have failed to identify it. Under such circumstances the possibility cannot be excluded that it represents Buddhaghosa’s own contribution to the grammatical analysis of the Pāli. Sāriputta corroborates, however, the assumption of Pāñinian grammar as Buddhaghosa’s main source through implicit references to Kāśikā ad loc.⁴⁸

⁴⁶Cf. Kāś ad loc.: *jānāter avidarthasyājñānārthasya karane kārake sāṣṭhī vibhaktir bhavati: sarpiṣo jānīte; madhuno jānīte.*

⁴⁷Cf. Kāś ad loc.: *adhīgarthāḥ smarārthāḥ ... eteśām karmani kārake śeṣatvena vivakṣite sāṣṭhī vibhaktir bhavati ... mātūḥ smarati.*

⁴⁸Cf. Sāriputta ad loc.: *yadā jānāti-saddo bodhanattho na hoti, tadā tassa payoge “sappino jānāti, madhuno jānāti” ti ādisu viya karaṇatthe sāmivacanam saddasatthavidū icchanti ti āha: “kiñci ... pe ...” ti. tenāha: “karāṇa-° ... pe ...” ti. ettha ca “kiñci ... pe ...” ti kenaci dukkhena karaṇabhūtena visayam nānubhosī ti evam attho veditabbo. “kiñci” ti etthāpi hi karaṇatthe sāmivacanassa lopo kato. ten’ eva ca vakkhati “vikappa-° ... pe ...” ti. yadā pana jānāti-saddo saraṇattho hoti, tadā saraṇatthānam dhātusaddānam payoge mātū sarati, pitu sarati, bhātū jānāti ti ādisu viya upayogatthe sāmivacanam saddasatthavidū vadanti ti āha: “athavā ... pe ...” ti. kassaci dukkhassa ananubhūtāttā anubhūtam appamattakam pi dukkham pariyesamāno pi abhāvato yeva na saraṇi ti attho. “vikappadvaye pi” ti anubhavana-saraṇatthavasena vutte dutiyatatiyavikappadvaye. “purimapadassā” ti = kiñci ti padassa. “uttarapadenā” ti dukkhassā ti padena. “sāmānavibhāttilopo” ti*

2 [Sp 209,27–210,1 ad Vin III 16,5]

After having quoted the passage in question: *attihi nāma tāta Sudinna ābhidosikam kummāsam paribhuñjissasi ti*: “Is it possible, dear Sudinna, that you are eating last evening’s barley-gruel?”, Buddhaghosa continues:

akkharacintakā pan’ ettha imam lakkhanam vadanti: anokappanāmarisanatthavasena etam atthi-nāma-sadde [so read for Ee atthi nāma sadde] upapade paribhuñjissasi ti anāgatavacanam katam. tassāyam attho: atthi nāma — pe — paribhuñjissasi ti idam paccakkham pi ahañ na saddhāmi, na marisayāmi [so read with v.l. for Ee parisayāmi] ti.

In this case, moreover, the grammarians (*akkharacintakā*), set forth the following rule (*lakkhanam*): according to whether the meaning is that something is not likely to take place, or is not to be tolerated (*anokappanāmarisanatthavasena*), the future *paribhuñjissasi* is employed, when the expression “is it possible?” is a sentence complement (*attihi-nāma-sadde upapade*). The meaning of the [sentence] “Is it possible...?” is as follows: “I do not believe it, even though it is evident, nor do I tolerate it”.

uttarapadenasamānassa sāmivacanassa lopo. kassaci dukkhassā ti vattabbe vikappadvaye pi purimapade sāmivacanassa lopam katvā kiñci dukkhassā ti niddeso kato [Sp-ṭ Be 1960 II 4,17–5,6].

In this grammatical analysis, Buddhaghosa focuses on a syntactical peculiarity of the sentence complement (*upapada*) “*atthi*”, which systematically requires construction with the future tense, whereas, from a semantical point of view, the implied tense in such a context is to be interpreted as present.⁴⁹ The grammarians mentioned by Buddhaghosa in this case are undoubtedly identical with the Pāṇinians since the analysis is based on Pāṇ. III 3 [145+] 146: *kimkilāstyarthesu lrt*: the future (denoted *lrt*) is used when [the words] “how comes it?” (*kimkila*) or [the words] meaning “is it possible?” (*asti*) [are syntactically constructed with it, and the action is either not likely to take place, or not to be tolerated].⁵⁰

3 [Sp 288,12–15 ad Vin III 42,13–14]

*katham hi nāma so bhikkhave moghapuriso
sabbamattikāmayam kuṭikam karissati [= Vin III
42,13–14] ti idam atitatthe anāgatavacanam akāsi ti
vuttam hoti; tassa lakkhanam saddasatthato
pariyesitabbam.*

With regard to the [sentence]: “How can it be, monks,
that this foolish man has made a hut out of nothing

⁴⁹As noted by Sāriputta in his comment, the usage of the future tense in a construction like this is exclusively present in meaning. Cf. his commentary ad loc.: *anokappanāmarisanatthavasenā ti ettha anokappanam asaddahanam. amarisanam asahanam. anāgatavacanam anāgatasaddappayoge. atho pana vat-tamānakāliko va. tenāha “paccakkham pī” ti. na marisayāmī ti na visahāmi* [Sp-ṭ Be 1960 II 9,1-3].

⁵⁰Cf. Kāś ad loc.: *anavaklptyamarsayoh iti vartate. ... kimkilāstyarthesu upapadesu anavaklptyamarsayoh dhātoḥ lrt pratyayo bhavati. ... asti nāma tatrabhavān vṛṣalam yājayisyati. ... na śraddadhe, na marṣayāmi.*

mud ?”, it is explained that the future (*anāgatavacanam*) is used in the sense of the past (*atitatthe*); the rule (*lakkhanam*) for this should be sought in grammar (*saddasatthato*).

The intention of this note is to explain why the future is used in preference to the tense required by the actual time [= past time] of the action referred to. In the present case Buddhaghosa refers to Pāṇ. III 3 [142+] 144: *kimvṛtte liṇlṛtau*: “the [inflections] of the potential mood (*liṇ*) and the future (*lṛt*) are used when [interrogative pronouns like] ‘*kim*’ occur [as a sentence complement, the meaning implied by the sentence being that of ‘censure’]”.⁵¹

One would have expected Buddhaghosa to refer to Pāṇ. III 3 [142+] 143: *vibhāṣā kathami liṇ ca*: the [inflections] of the potential mood (*liṇ*) [as well as the inflections of the present tense (*laṭ*)] are optionally used, when [the word] “*katham*” [is used as a sentence complement, the meaning implied by the sentence being that of “censure”].⁵² There are in fact quite a number of instances in the Vin where “*katham*” is constructed with the potential mood, but they are not commented upon by Buddhaghosa.⁵³ It is possible, however, that he reinterpreted the scope of Pāṇ. III 3 144 in order to find a grammatical justification for the usage in the Pāli, which in this case deviates from the usage described by Pāṇini. Sāriputta’s commentary on this passage in Sp

⁵¹Cf. Kāś ad loc.: *kimvṛtte upapade garhāyām gamyamānāyām dhātoḥ liṇlṛtau pratyayau bhavataḥ. sarvalakārānām apavādāḥ. liṇgrahaṇām laṭo ‘pari-grahārtham.*

⁵²Cf. Kāś ad loc.: *kathami upapade garhāyām gamyamānāyām dhātoḥ liṇ pratyayo bhavati, cakārāl laṭ ca. vibhāṣāgrahaṇām yathāsvam kālavisaye vihitānām abādhanārtham.*

⁵³Cf.: *katham hi nāma mādiso samānam vā brāhmaṇām vā vijite vasantam haneyya vā badheyya vā pabbājeyya vā*, Vin III 44,15-17.

shows that he identified the reference to *saddasattha* with Pāṇ III 3 144.⁵⁴

4 [Sp 296,13–14 ad Vin III 44,19]

Once again Buddhaghosa focuses on a question of semantics: the meaning of \sqrt{pac} . The term *vipācenti* which he comments upon in this case is found in the following passage: *manussā ujjhāyanti khīyanti vipācenti*: “*alajjino ime samanā sakyaputtiyā ...*” [= Vin III 44,19 foll.]. He writes:

vipācentī ti viṭṭhārikāñ karonti, sabbattha pattharanti;
ayañ ca attho saddasatthānusārena veditabbo.

“*vipācenti*” means: they disseminate far and wide, they report in detail everywhere. The meaning, moreover, should be known according to grammar.

Grammar in this case is, as in the previous examples from Vism, in all probability identical with sa-Dhātup. Cf. sa-Dhātup X 109: *paci vistāravacane*.⁵⁵

⁵⁴Cf. Sāriputta ad loc.: *saddasatthavidūhi kimsaddayoge anāgatavacanassa icchitattā vuttam “tassa lakkhaṇam saddasatthato pariyesitabban” ti* [Sp-ṭ Be 1960 II 117,14–16].

⁵⁵Cf. Sadd 528,26: *paci viṭṭhāre*.

5 [Sp 480,26–481,6 ad Vin III 88,2–4]

The problem which Buddhaghosa addresses this time is how to interpret the past participle “*bhāsito*” which occurs in the following passage:

eso yeva kho āvuso seyyo yo amhākām gihīnam aññamaññassa uttarimanussadhammassa vanño bhāsito ti.

The best thing, friends, is if we speak to householders in praise of one another’s superhuman properties.

It would seem natural in the present case to construe the genitive “*amhākām*” [= the agent] with “*bhāsito*” used in the sense of the present tense.⁵⁶ If, however, it is interpreted according to the absolute tense value of the past participle, and this is clearly how Buddhaghosa interprets the form, it would seem to be in contradiction to the context in which the enunciation occurs: the *Vajī janapada* is suffering from the famine and the monks have difficulties in providing for themselves. Therefore they decide to speak in praise of one another’s spiritual attainments in order to ingratiate themselves with householders, hoping that they, on those grounds, will provide for them. Since the context makes it impossible to interpret “*bhāsito*” as referring to the past, Buddhaghosa suggests complementing the sentence in such a way that the intention becomes unambiguous. He writes:

⁵⁶Cf. Pāṇ II 3 67: *ktasya ca vartamāne*: The past participle in *-ta* [is constructed with the genitive], when used in the sense of the present tense. Cf. also Pāṇ III 2 187–188; Pāṇ does not mention $\sqrt{bhās}$ among the roots the pp. of which may be interpreted in the sense of the present tense. In Pāli, however, this usage seems to be extended to include other instances than those described by Pāṇini.

anāgatasambandhe pana asati na etehi yo tasmīm khane bhāsito 'va yasmā [CeBeSe so; Ee tasmā] na yujjati, tasmā anāgatasambandham katvā yo evam bhāsito bhavissati so seyyo ti evam ettha attho veditabbo. lakkhanam pana saddasathato pariyesitabbam.

Since the [praise they] spoke at that moment would be unjustified, if there were no connection [of *bhāsito* = pp. of $\sqrt{bhās}$] with the future tense (*anāgatasambandhe pana asati*), by formulating a connection with the future tense, the meaning is in this case to be understood as follows: “the best thing would be if we spoke (*bhāsito bhavissati*) in such and such a way”. The rule, moreover, should be sought in grammar.

The rule to which Buddhaghosa refers here as a justification for complementing the verbal form *bhāsito* with the future form *bhavissati* [from $\sqrt{bhū}$], is found in Pāñ III 4 1: *dhātusambandhe pratyayāḥ*: affixes are [valid in denoting a time other than the one for which they have been specifically enjoined] when they are used for [establishing] a relation between [the meanings of] the roots [in question].

The problem which Pāñini addresses in this sūtra is that the usage of a particular suffix is generally restricted to the specific tense value that is attached to it. For instance, according to Pāñ III 2 85 a word like “*agniṣṭomayājīn*” has a past tense value. It denotes a person who already has performed the *agniṣṭoma*. But in a sentence like “*agniṣṭomayājīy asya putro janitā*”: “he shall have a son who will perform the *agniṣṭoma*”, a word with a past tense value (“*agniṣṭomayājīn*”) is construed with a word that has a future tense value (“*janitā*”). In such a case the future tense value of *janitā* takes precedence over the past tense value of

agniṣṭomayājīn, which thus assumes a future value. The same is the case in a sentence like: *kṛtaḥ kātaḥ śvo bhavitā*: “the mat will be made tomorrow”. In this clause the future tense value of *bhavitā* takes precedence over the absolute tense value of the past participle *kṛtaḥ*.⁵⁷

Here too, there is no reason for doubting that the grammar to which Buddhaghosa refers his readers is identical with Pāñinian grammar. Sāriputta cannot have been in doubt since he quotes the sūtra in question. In addition he presents a slightly edited quotation from the Kāśikā.⁵⁸

6 [Sp 500,18–20 ad Vin III 95,3]

ukkhetito [= Vin III 95,3] ti idam ariyamaggena uttāsitattā ... svāyam attho saddasathatato pariyesitabbo.

The expression “scared” [*ukkhetito*] is used because he is scared of the Noble Path. ... The meaning is to be sought in grammar.

Here Buddhaghosa is concerned with the meaning of *ut + √khit*. In this case too, grammar is probably identical with sa-Dhātup. Cf. sa-

⁵⁷Cf. Kāś ad loc.: *dhātvarthānam sambandho viśesanavīśesyabhāvah. tasmin sati ayathākāloktā api pratyayāḥ sādhavo bhavanti. ... kṛtaḥ kātaḥ śvo bhavitā. ... tatra bhūtaḥ kālaḥ bhavīsyatkālenā abhisambadhyamānaḥ sādhur bhavati. viśesanam gunatvād viśesyakālaṁ anurudhyate, tena viparyayo na bhavati.*

⁵⁸Cf.: “*anāgatasambandhe pana asati*” *ti bhāsito bhavissati ti pāñhasesam katvā anāgatasambandhe asati. bhāsito ti atītavacanam katham anāgatavacanena sambandham upagacchati ti āha “lakkhanam pana saddasathato pariyesitabbam” ti. idise hi thāne “dhātusambandhe paccayā” [= Pāñ III 4 1] ti iminā lakkhanena dhātvarthasambandhe asati ayathākālavīti pi paccayā sādhavo santi [≠ Kāś ad Pāñ III 4 1] ti saddasathavidū vadanti [Sp-ṭ Be 1960 II 278,21-26 ad loc.].*

Dhātup I 324: *khiṭ trāse*. This assumption is corroborated by Sāriputta's *ṭīkā* ad loc.⁵⁹

7 [Sp 584,16–21 ad Vin III 163,21,30]

It is not clear how we are to interpret Buddhaghosa's reference to grammar (*saddalakkhanam*) in this case. The two words he comments upon (*duṭṭho doso*) occur in the following passage: *yo pana bhikkhu bhikkhum duṭṭho doso appatīto ... anuddhamseyya*: “whatever monk, offended, indignant⁶⁰, and ill-tempered, would defame a monk ...” [= Vin III 163,21–22]. The niddesa presents the following gloss on the two words: *duṭṭho doso ti kupito anattamano anabhiraddho āhatacitto khilajāto* [= Vin III 163,30–31], but this gloss obviously does not clarify the question of how to construe them. The past participle *duṭṭho* [from \sqrt{dus}] presents no problem, but *doso* does. In this particular context it can only be interpreted as an adjective which in meaning is related to, if not synonymous with, *duṭṭho* and derived from the same root.⁶¹ This, apparently, is also the view of Buddhaghosa, who seems to interpret *doso* as a derivative of the causative stem of \sqrt{dus} :

“*duṭṭho doso*” *ti, dūsito c’ eva dūsako ca, uppanne hi dose puggalo tena dosena dūsito hoti: pakatibhāvam*

⁵⁹Cf.: *khitasaddam saddasatthavidū uttāsatthe pathantī ti āha “svāyam attho saddasatthato pariyesitabbo”* *ti* [Sp-ṭ Be 1960 II 290,19-20]; Sadd 352,11: *khiṭa uttrāsane*.

⁶⁰The translation is tentative. It is obvious from the context that corrupted and corrupting are too strong; *doso* is probably used epexegetically of *duṭṭho* in order to show that it does not mean corrupted, but rather indignant and upset, which the context would seem to support.

⁶¹In Pāli *dosa* normally occurs as a noun. This passage is the only recorded instance in the canon where it would seem necessary to interpret *dosa* as an adjective.

jahāpito, tasmā duṭṭho ti vuccati. parañ ca dūseti vināseti, tasmā doso ti vuccati. iti duṭṭho doso ti. ekass’ ev’ etam puggalassa dassitam [v.1. *nidassanam*], *tena vuttam duṭṭho doso ti dūsito c’ eva dūsako cā ti. tattha saddalakkhanam pariyesitabbam.*

“Offended, offending”, that is, “one who is both offended and one who offends (*dūsito c’ eva dūsako ca*)”. Because (*hi*), when an offence has taken place (*uppanne dose*), a person is offended on account of this offence, that is, he is shocked (*pakatibhāvam jahāpito*), therefore he is called “offended”. And because he causes another [person] to be offended and frustrated therefore he is called “offending”. Hence (*iti*) [the words] “offended, offending”. This is used as an illustration of a single person according to the difference in his behaviour (*ākāranānattena*). Therefore it is said [above]: “offended, offending”, that is, “one who is both offended and one who offends”. One should consult grammar (*saddalakkhanam*) on this point.

The question is whether Buddhaghosa actually wants his reader to refer to grammar for information on the derivation and meaning of *duṭṭha* and *doso*. It is clear that his purpose is to show that the two terms are mutually opposed, in the sense that one (*duṭṭha*) is intransitive (*kammasādhana*), whereas the other (*doso*) is transitive (*kattusādhana*), which, of course, is reflected in their respective meanings. This is also the way in which Sāriputta understands Buddhaghosa. But in addition he points out that the reason why Buddhaghosa says that a person who is *dūsito* is one who is shocked, is because \sqrt{dus} is read [in the Dhātupāṭha]

in the sense of alteration (*vikatiyam pañhitattā*).⁶² This remark seems to point to the fact that we are dealing with yet another reference to sa-Dhātup, which in view of the other references to sa-Dhātup is likely to be true. In that case it must be a reference to sa-Dhātup IV 76: *dusa vaikṛtye*.

8 [Sp 770,33–37 ad Vin IV 38,2–3]

The last instance of explicit reference to grammar in Buddhaghosa's Samantapāsādikā is presumably also to sa-Dhātup. In this case it is to the meaning of the root *ut + √jhe* (= sa. √*dhyā*). The passage in which the form occurs presents no problem; it represents one of the stereotypes that are often met with in the Nikāyas.

ujjhāpenti [= Vin IV 38,2–3; this reading is recorded as a variant by the ct., which reads *ujjhāyanti*]; *Dabbam Mallaputtam bhikkhū ujjhāyanti ... tam āyasmantam tehi bhikkhūhi avajānāpenti avaññāya olokāpenti lāmakato vā cintāpenti ti attho. lakkhaṇam pan' ettha saddasathānusārena veditabbam.*

The definition (*lakkhaṇam*) is this time found in sa-Dhātup I 957: *dhyai cintāyām*. The identification is, if Sāriputta is correct, confirmed by his explicit reference to the Dhātupātha, with the remark

⁶²Cf. *dūsito ti duṭṭhasaddassa kammasādhanatām dasseti. dūsayati param vināseti ti dūsako; iminā dūsayati ti doso ti dosasaddassa kattusādhanatā vuttā “pakaṭibhāvam jahāpito” ti dusasaddassa vikatiyam pañhitattā vuttam* [Sp-ṭ Be 1960 II 347,15–18 ad loc.].

that, since verbal roots have multiple meanings, the root √*jhe* has also the meaning of “looking down upon”.⁶³

Sumaṅgalavilāsini

1 [Sv 43,13–15 ad D I 2,9]

In this short passage Buddhaghosa comments upon the expression “*acchariyam āvuso*”. The subject matter is the etymology of the word *acchariya*. First he presents the grammatical derivation (*saddanaya*) which he subsequently contrasts with the etymological derivation presented by the Aṭṭhakathās (*atṭhakathānaya*). The *saddanaya* is explained in this way:

*tattha andhassa pabbatārohanam viya niccam na hotī ti acchariyam. ayam tāva saddanayo.*⁶⁴

In this case *acchariyam* means something unusual (*na ... niccam*), like for instance a blind man who goes mountain climbing. This, in the first place, is the grammatical derivation⁶⁵.

⁶³Cf. *tatiye dhātupāthe jhesaddo cintāyam pathito ti āha “lāmakato vā cintāpenti” ti ādi. ayam eva ca anekathatā dhātūnam olokanattho pi hotī ti datthabbam* [Sp-ṭ Be 1960 III 24,17–19 ad loc.].

⁶⁴Cf. Mp I 113,11–13 ad *acchariyamanusso*.

⁶⁵Cf. *saddasathām anugato nayo saddanayo. tattha hi anabhinnavuttike acchariyosaddo icchito. ten' ev' āha “andhassa pabbatārohanam viyā” ti* [Sv-ṭ I 67,17–18 ad loc.].

The *saddanaya* to which Buddhaghosa refers here is in all likelihood identical with Pāṇ. VI 1 147: *āścaryam anitye*: the word ‘*āścaryam*’ [is formed with the augment *sūt* = *s-*] in the sense of something unusual.⁶⁶

2 [Sv 245,16–19 ad D I 87,7–8]

In this case Buddhaghosa selects the following clause for a grammatical comment: *Ukkattham ajjhāvasatī ti*, and continues:

*upasaggavasen' ettha bhummattē upayogavacanam
veditabbam ... tath' [Ee tath'] eva lakkhanam* [CeBe
so; Ee *na-*] *saddasatthato* [so read with v.l. and Sv-t]
pariyesitabbam.

In the present case it should be understood that the accusative, because of the preposition, is used in the sense of the locative. ... The rule for this should be sought in grammar.⁶⁷

The definition which Buddhaghosa has in mind in this case is Pāṇ. I 4 [45+46+] 48: *upānvadhyāñ vasah*: [the place of the action] of

√*vas*, when preceded by [the prepositions] *upa*, *anu*, *adhi*, and *ā* [is called “*karma*” (= the object *kāraka*)].⁶⁸

3 [Sv 481,3–5 ad D II 55,3]

Even though Buddhaghosa does not explicitly refer to grammarians or to grammar in this concise explanation of an apparent grammatical anomaly, there is good reason for including it among the examples of his references to grammar. Firstly, Buddhaghosa contrasts this explanation with the subsequent explanation of the Atṭhakathācariyas. Judging from the way in which he normally contrasts the views of the grammarians on points of grammar with the views represented by the Atṭhakathās, one can assume that his explanation is based on the views of the grammarians. Secondly, in his *ṭīkā*, Dhammapāla expressly identifies Buddhaghosa’s grammatical analysis with the opinion of the grammarians (*akkharacintakā*).

*tatrāyam anuttānapadavāññā. Kurūsu viharatī ti,
Kurū nāma jānapadino rājakumārā, tesam nivāso eko
pi jānapado rūlhiśaddena Kurū ti vuccati: tasmiṁ
Kurūsu jānapade.*⁶⁹

In this case the following explanation is dealing with an obscure word. “Was dwelling in the Kuru state”: [the plural form] *Kurū* denotes those citizens who are descendants of the ruling class [of the state]. Although

⁶⁶Cf. *anityatayā viśayabhūtayā adbhutatvam iha upalakṣyate, tasminn āścaryam
nipātyate* [Kāś ad loc.].

⁶⁷Cf.: “*saddasatthato pariyesitabban*” *ti etena saddalakkhañānuyogato vāyam
saddapayogo ti dasseti. upa, anu, adhi, ā iti evampubbake vasanakiriyādhāre
upayogavacanam eva pāpūrñatī ti hi saddavidū icchanti* [Sv-pt. Be 1960 I 376,5-9]. For an identical analysis cf. Ps III 414,24-26 ad M II 164,6.

⁶⁸Cf. Kāś ad loc.: *upa, anu, adhi, ā* ity *evampūrvasya vasater ādhāro yah, tat
kārakam karmasāññam bhavati*. Sv-pt ad loc. would seem to represent a slightly edited version of Kāś. Cf. note 67 supra.

⁶⁹Qu. Ps I 225,4-6; Cf. the identical passages in Sv 279,4-7 ad D I 111,2: *Āngesu*; 294,4-6 ad D I 127,2: *Magadhesu* and 672,3-8 ad D II 253,3: *Sakkesu*.

their habitation is singular, their state is denoted by the conventional term “*Kurū* [in the plural]”. [Consequently the loc. pl. “*kurūsu*” means] “in the Kuru state”.

The grammatical problem which Buddhaghosa briefly identifies and explains is the fact that the plural form “*Kurū*”, which actually denotes the descendants of the ruling class of a certain state, is used as the name of this state. Since the state as such is confined to a specific territory, one would expect it to be denoted by a noun in the singular. Moreover, when the words “*Kurū*” and “*janapada*” are used in apposition there is no syntactical agreement between them. The reason is, as Buddhaghosa explains, that the usage of the word “*Kurū*” is determined by convention (*rūlhīsadda*), which in the present case means that usage takes precedence over the general rules of syntactical agreement.

Buddhaghosa’s source in this case is no doubt Pāṇinian grammar. In his *ṭīkā*, Dhammapāla quotes (in slightly edited Pāli versions) two sūtras in which Pāṇini refers to certain views on grammatical derivation, the necessity and validity of which he is questioning later on.

The first sūtra quoted by Dhammapāla is Pāṇ I 2 51⁷⁰: *lupi yuktavad vyaktivacane*⁷¹: In the case where [a *taddhita* affix] is elided [provided that the elision is denoted by “*lup*”], the gender and number [of the derivative from which they are elided] are the same as when they are

⁷⁰Cf. Sv-pṭ II 103,6-7 (Ee is utterly confused): *akkharacintakā hi idisesu thānesu yutte viya* [so read with Be (= sa. *yuktavat*); Ee *suttēsu*; cf. v.ll.] *idisalingavacanāni* [so read with Be; Ee *viliṅga*; cf. v.ll.] *icchanti*. In this quote Dhammapāla is replacing the archaic *vyakti* with *linga*.

⁷¹Cf. *vyaktiḥ = stripūṇapuṇṣakāni. vacanam = ekatadvitvabahutvāni. Pañcālāḥ = kṣatriyāḥ pūṇliṅgā bahuvacanaviyāyah. teṣām nivāso janapadah. yathā teṣu kṣatriyeṣu vyaktivacane tadvaj janapade bhavataḥ: Pañcālāḥ, Kuravah* [Kāś ad loc.].

joined [to the original word]. The purpose of this sūtra is to explain why certain words that are considered to be derivatives retain the gender and number of the word from which they are derived. For example, the word *Pañcālāḥ* is masculine plural, but applies to a single *janapada*.

The second sūtra quoted by Dhammapāla is the subsequent sūtra 52: *viśeṣaṇānām cājateḥ*.⁷² The underlying intention of this rule is to explain that terms which qualify such derivatives agree with them except when a qualifier is a class term, e.g. *janapada*, in which case the class term is used in the singular, whereas an additional qualifier agrees with the latter.⁷³

Finally, Dhammapāla might also have been expected to quote Pāṇ IV 2 81: *janapade lup*: [the suffixes whose function is defined in IV 2 67-70] are elided [provided that the elision is denoted by “*lup*”] when [the dwelling-place that is denoted by the word] is a kingdom.⁷⁴

We cannot know, of course, whether Buddhaghosa was actually thinking of these Pāṇinian sūtras when he wrote his commentary. Dhammapāla may be right when he identifies Buddhaghosa’s source with Pāṇ I 2 51-52. But the possibility cannot be excluded that the actual sūtras Buddhaghosa had in mind were the following sūtras 53-55: *tad aśiṣyam samjñāpramāṇatvāt. lubyogāprakhyānāt. yogapramāṇe ca tadabhāve 'darśanam syāt*. In these sūtras Pāṇini explains why it is unnecessary to establish those complicated rules of derivation described in 51-52 in order to explain usages that in the final analysis are based on convention.⁷⁵

⁷²Cf. Sv-pṭ II 103,11-12: *tabbisesane janapadasadde jātisadde ekavacanam eva*.

⁷³Cf. *ajāteḥ iti kim? Pañcālāḥ janapadah... jātyarthasya cāyām yuktavadbhāva-pratiṣedhah. tena jātivāreṇa yāni viśeṣānāni teṣām api yuktavadbhāvo na bhavati: Pañcālāḥ janapado ramanīyo* [Kāś ad loc.].

⁷⁴Cf. *Pañcālānām nivāso janapado Pañcālāḥ* [Kāś ad loc.].

⁷⁵Cf. Kāś ad 55: *drṣyate ca samprati vinaiva kṣatriyasambandhena janapadesu pañcālādiśabdāḥ, tato avasīyate nāyām yoganimittakah. kim tarhi rūḍhirūpenaiva tatra pravṛttah.*

Papañcasūdanī

1 [Ps I 59,26–28 ad M I 6,27]

In this example Buddhaghosa comments upon the derivation of the city name Sāvatthī. He explains that it has this specific form because it is named after the ṛṣi Savattha who lived there.

*Sāvatthī ti Savatthassa isino nivāsaṭṭhānabhūtā nagarī, yathā Kākandī, Mākandī, [Ce v.l. adds Kosambī; Ee om., cf. Ps-pt] ti. evam akkharacintakā.*⁷⁶

“Sāvatthī” is a city which has status as the place where the ṛṣi Savattha was living, as for example Kākandī and Mākandī. This is the opinion of the grammarians.

This reference is undoubtedly to Pāṇ IV 2 [67+] 69: *tasya nivāsaḥ*: [when attached to a word the affix denoted “*an*” and its substitutes mean] “dwelling-place of someone”, [the place being named after the person in question]. Buddhaghosa is probably also thinking of the preceding sūtra 68: *tena nivṛttam*: [an affix attached to a word means] “constructed by someone”, [the place being named after the person in question]. The Kāśikā illustrates *inter alia* this rule with the following example: *Kuśāmbena nivṛttā Kauśāmbī nagarī*. Dhammapāla probably

⁷⁶Qu. Pj I 110,15-18; Patis-a 532,16-18. Pj I adds after *Mākandī ti evam iṭṭhiliṅgavasena Sāvatthī vuccati*. Cf. also Ud-a 55,13-16; Ps II 389,30-390,2 ad M I 320,26: *Kosambiyam*.

has the same rule in mind in his ṭīkā.⁷⁷ There is no reference to ṛṣis in this particular context in the Pāṇinian tradition, but this, of course, does not exclude the assumption that Buddhaghosa is relying on Pāṇinian tradition for his interpretation.

⁷⁷Cf. *yathā Kākandī Mākandī Kosambī ti yathā Kākandassa isino nivāsaṭṭhāne māpitā nagarī Kākandī; Mākandassa nivāsaṭṭhāne māpitā Mākandī; Kusumbassa nivāsaṭṭhāne māpitā Kosambī ti vuccati. evam Sāvatthī ti dasseti* [Ps-pt I 140,15-18]; cf. Ps II 390,1-2: *Kusumbassa nāma isino assamato avidūre māpitattā ti pi eke*.

2 [Ps I 129,32–33 ad M I 24,1]

In this instance Buddhaghosa addresses the question of the function and meaning of word-repetition (*āmen̄dita* = sa. *āmredita*) as it occurs in the clause: *abhikkantam bho Gotama, abhikkantam bho Gotama*. In order to define the various semantic properties of *āmen̄dita*, he quotes the following verse:

*bhaye kodhe pasamsāyam turite kotūhalacchare
hāse soke pasāde ca kare āmen̄ditam budho.*⁷⁸

An intelligent person should use word-repetition in the following meanings: [1] threat, [2] anger, [3] praise, [4] haste, [5] excitement, [6] wonder, [7] joy, [8] sorrow, and [9] satisfaction.⁷⁹

Even though Buddhaghosa does not refer to grammarians or grammar in this case, the grammatical interest attached to this verse is reason enough for including it among his grammatical references.

It has not been possible to identify the source used by Buddhaghosa. The possibility cannot be excluded, however, that the verse is a Pāli adaptation of a Sanskrit verse, in which case there is good reason to believe that it represents an old kośa fragment. The verse was adopted by the compiler of the Abhidhānappadipikā [v. Abh 107] and shows a structural similarity with many of the verses that constitute Abh.⁸⁰

⁷⁸This verse is found in similar contexts in Sp 170,24–25; Sv 228,11–12 [cf. Sv-pt I 354,25 foll]; Mp II 105,25–26; Sadd 40,29.

⁷⁹For examples of the various usages of *āmen̄dita*, cf. Sv-pt I 354,25–355,7.

⁸⁰For this Pāli dictionary, cf. Norman, *Pāli Literature* pp. 166–167; Franke, *Gramm.* pp. 65–83.

In any case, there is a clear relation between the various functions which the verse ascribes to *āmen̄dita* and the corresponding definition of *āmredita* found in Pāñ VIII 1 [2+] 8: *vākyāder āmantritasyāsūyāsammaticopakutsanabhartsanesu*: A vocative in the beginning of a clause is repeated in the following meanings: [1] envy, [2] praise, [3] anger, [4] blame, or [5] threat. It is evident from this sūtra that the set of definitions found in the verse quoted by Buddhaghosa merely represents an elaborate version of the Pāñinian definition.

3 [Ps II 389,29–390,1–2 ad M I 320,27]

In this example Buddhaghosa comments upon the derivation of the city name Kosambī. This time he does not refer explicitly to the opinion of the grammarians, but since his comment is intimately connected in subject-matter with the preceding example there is no reason to doubt that he is presenting the views of the grammarians. In addition, the specific grammatical rules upon which his comment is based can easily be traced to Pāñinian grammar.

tattha Kosambiyān ti evamnāmake nagare. tassa hi [so read with v.l.; Ee kira] nagarassa ārāmapokkharaṇiādisu tesu tesu thānesu kosambarukkhā va ussannā ahesum, tasmā Kosambī ti saṅkham agāmasi. Kusumbassa nāma isino assamato avidūre māpitattā ti pi eke.

In this case [the locative] “in Kosambī” means in a city thus named. Because there was an abundance of Kosamba trees in various places of this city such as in the parks and by the lotus ponds or the like, it was called Kosambī. Some [grammarians] are of the

opinion that [it is called Kosambī] because it was constructed not far from the hermitage of the ṛṣi Kusamba".

There were apparently different views among grammarians about the correct derivation of Kosambī. Buddhaghosa therefore presents two alternative explanations, the first of which probably represents his own view. Both alternatives are based on two Pāṇini sūtras. In the first explanation he analyses Kosambī according to Pāṇ IV 2 67: *tad asminn astūti deśe tannāmni*: [when attached to a word the affix denoted “*an*” and its substitutes are used] in the sense of a place having such and such a name because such and such a thing is found in it. In the second explanation he presents the view of some scholars who apparently explained the derivation of Kosambī on the basis of Pāṇ IV 2 70: *adūrabhavaś ca*: and [lastly a place is named after whatever is found in its] vicinity.

Manorathapūraṇī

1 [Mp I 17,12–15 ad A I 1,7]

Buddhaghosa here focusses on the grammarians' definition of the meaning of the suffix -u attached to the term bhikkhu [= sa. bhikṣu; derived from the desiderative root $\sqrt{bhikṣ}$]. He writes:

bhikkhavo ti āmantanākāradīpanam, tañ ca bhikkhana-sīlatādiguṇayogaśiddhātā vuttam; bhikkhanasīlatā-guṇayutto pi hi bhikkhu, bhikkhanadhammatāguṇa-

*yutto pi bhikkhu, bhikkhane sādhukāritāguṇayutto pi ti saddavidū maññanti.*⁸¹

The [vocative] “monks” is an encouragement in the form of an invitation (*āmantanākāradīpanam*), and this [encouragement] is used because they have acquired such attributes as the habit of begging, etc. For a mendicant is either one who is in possession of the attribute that consists of the habit of begging, or one who is in possession of the quality that consists of the nature of begging, or one who is in possession of the attribute that consists of skillfulness in begging. This is the opinion of the grammarians.

The grammarians to whom Buddhaghosa refers as his source for this grammatical analysis are definitely Pāṇinians. The three qualities (*sīlatā, dhammatā, sādhukāritā*) which he enumerates in order to define the scope of meaning of the term *bhikkhu* are identical with those mentioned in Pāṇ III 2 134: *ā kveḥ tacchilataddharmatatsādhukāriṣu*: from this sūtra to sūtra 177 [the affixes that are being described are used] in the sense [of agents] having such a habit (*sīla*) or such a nature (*dharma*) or such a skill (*sādhukārin*). This rule covers Pāṇ III 2 168 where Pāṇini deals with derivatives from desiderative roots and inter alia $\sqrt{bhikṣ}$: *sanāśamsabhiṣṭa uh*.⁸² It is obvious that Buddhaghosa must have had both sūtras in mind when he wrote this grammatical comment.

⁸¹This text is also found in Ps I 13,29–33 and Spk II 1,19–2,3.

⁸²Cf. *sanantebhyo dhātubhyah āśamser bhikṣeś ca tacchilādiṣu kartṛṣu uh pratayayo bhavati* [Kāś ad loc.].

2 [Mp III 76,15–20 ad A II 37,22–23]

In this case Buddhaghosa focusses on the usage of the preposition “*antarā*” in the following passage: *ekam samayam Bhagavā antarā ca Ukkattham antarā ca Setabbyam addhānamaggapatipanno hoti*: “Once Bhagavā was on his way between Ukkattham and Setabbyam”. He continues:

*antarāsaddena pana yuttattā upayogavacanam katam. edisesu ca thānesu akkharacintakā ‘antarā gāmañ ca nadiñ ca yātī’ ti evam ekam eva [v.l. ettha] antarāsaddam payuñjanti, so dutiyapadena pi yojetabbo hoti, ayojiyamāne upayogavacanam na pāpuñāti. idha pana yojetvā eva [v.l. evam] vutto ti.*⁸³

Now the accusative is used because [Ukkattha and Setabbya] are construed with the word “between” (*antarā*). In such cases, however, the grammarians use the word “between” only once, as [e.g. in the following example]: he is on his way between the village and the river. The [word “*antarā*”] is surely to be construed with the second word, for if it were not construed [with it], the accusative would not obtain. And in the present case it is actually used in construction [with the second word].

⁸³ This text is also found in Sv 35,4-9; Ps II 188,26-30 (v.ll.: *idisesu hi ... ; payuñjanti*). Cf. Ud-a 110,5-9.

This argument is only understandable on the basis of Pāñ II 3 [1+] 4: *antarāntareñā yukte*: [a word] when constructed with *antarā* or *antareñā* [stands in the accusative]. When constructed with two nouns the preposition *antarā* generally precedes and the conjunction *ca* is put after each noun.⁸⁴ This is the basic usage in Sanskrit. In Pāli the situation is slightly different, as appears from the example Buddhaghosa has chosen to comment upon. He was apparently struck by the fact that *antarā* is used twice in contrast to normal Sanskrit usage. But he seems to regard this anomaly as a redundant feature which only emphasises Pāñini’s description of the syntactical usage of *antarā*.

Conclusion

The relatively few instances where Buddhaghosa refers to grammar or grammarians fall into two distinct categories: grammatical references [a] with emphasis on syntactical, morphological and derivational problems, [b] with emphasis on questions of semantics.

In the case of [a] it has been shown that practically all the references can without great difficulty be traced to particular Pāñinian sūtras. Although the possibility cannot be completely excluded that Buddhaghosa is referring to another grammar or grammatical system, it would seem extremely unlikely, in that the Pāñinian source is well corroborated by the tīkās. Buddhaghosa was obviously conversant with the Pāñinian tradition as a whole since his references to such topics as the usage of the locative case in a causal sense [= *nimittasaptamī*],⁸⁵ are only understandable on the basis of Mahā-bh [+ vārtikas] ad Pāñ II 3 36. Pāñini does not himself address this usage in his grammar.

⁸⁴ Cf.: *antarā tvāñ ca māñ ca kamañdaluh ... yuktagrahanam kim ? antarā Takṣaśilāñ ca Pāṭaliputram Srughnasya prākārah* [Kāś ad loc.].

⁸⁵ Cf. Sp 189,25; 727,20; 761,13.

In the case of [b] it is, of course, an open question whether Buddhaghosa actually refers to sa-Dhātup. There is good cause to believe that this is the case since it would be quite natural for him to make references to the collection of roots that was an indispensable part of the Pāṇinian grammatical system. It is, however, impossible to prove definitively that Buddhaghosa knew sa-Dhātup in its present form.

Buddhaghosa's references to grammar are not a pervasive feature in his works. Compared with the scope of his collected works they cannot, in fact, be considered an essential part of Buddhaghosa's scholarly work. But in the relatively few cases where he displays his skill as a grammarian and an interpreter, his analysis is always marked by a degree of sophistication that makes it reasonable to assume that the tradition about his elucidating the "ideas of Patañjali" (*Patañjalimata*)⁸⁶ in one night is founded on fact. Patañjalimata must be identical, in fact, not with the *yogasūtras* as Geiger assumed⁸⁷, but rather with the Mahā-bh.

Even though Buddhaghosa's references to grammar are relatively few and in several instances are applied in a way that leads one to assume that they represented a stock of grammatical explanations which he made use of in identical or analogous contexts, it is obvious that he must have assumed that the Buddhist scholars for whom he was writing were capable of identifying his references. Otherwise most of his grammatical analyses and statements about grammar would have been incomprehensible to them. Thus Buddhaghosa's references to grammar indirectly prove that the Sinhalese Buddhist scholars must have been conversant with Sanskrit and Sanskrit grammar.

It is, in fact, difficult to explain these references to Sanskrit grammar unless we assume that there was no clearly defined system of Pāli grammar in existence when Buddhaghosa was writing his

commentaries. It appears from the way in which he often presents his analyses that they were conceived as a sort of complement to the explanations embodied in the *atthakathās*. In such instances the grammarians' statements are sometimes contrasted with the explanations of the *atthakathās*. This too seems to prove that there was no full-scale Pāli grammar available to Buddhaghosa as a reference work.

To conclude, it is highly unlikely that Buddhaghosa, whose respectful attitude towards the tradition is beyond doubt, would have failed to refer to such a work, had it been in existence. There is therefore no cogent reason for assuming that there ever existed a comprehensive Pāli grammar or grammatical system prior to Kaccāyana's grammar. The fact that this, in many ways remarkable, adaptation of the Kātantra is based on a Sanskrit grammar only underlines the dependence of the Pāli grammatical tradition on Sanskrit grammar.

In a subsequent article I shall analyse references to and fragments from Pāli grammars that were presumably written in the tradition of Kaccāyana's grammar, the importance of which is beyond doubt in the development of the Sinhalese Pāli grammatical tradition.

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⁸⁶Cf. Mhv XXXVII 217.

⁸⁷Cf. Geiger, Mhv-Trsl. p. 23 no. 1.